![]() Indeed I take it that modern Idealists are chiefly distinguished by certain arguments which they have in common. But I take ‘Idealism’ to be a wide term and to include not only this interesting conclusion, but a number of arguments which are supposed to be, if not sufficient, at least necessary, to prove it. Reality may be spiritual, for all I know and I devoutly hope it is. For my own part I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not suppose that anything I shall say has the smallest tendency to prove that reality is not spiritual: I do not believe it possible to refute a single one of the many important propositions contained in the assertion that it is so. I say this lest it should be thought that any of the arguments which will be advanced in this paper would be sufficient to disprove, or any refutation of them sufficient to prove, the truly interesting and important proposition that reality is spiritual. But, when we begin to argue about it, I think we are apt to forget what a vast number of arguments this interesting question must involve: we are apt to assume, that if one or two points be made on either side, the whole case is won. It is, I think, owing to the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different excellencies which Idealists attribute to the universe, that it seems such an interesting and important question whether Idealism be true or not. Now why I mention these two points is that when engaged in the intricacies of philosophic discussion, we are apt to overlook the vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of different propositions which the idealist must prove. When we say it is spiritual we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers. In general, it may be said, this phrase ‘reality is spiritual’ excites and expresses the belief that the whole universe possesses all the qualities the possession of which is held to make us so superior to things which seem to be inanimate: at least, if it does not possess exactly those which we possess, it possesses not one only, but several others, which, by the same ethical standard, would be judged equal to or better than our own. That it is intelligent that it is purposeful that it is not mechanical all these different things are commonly asserted of it. When the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is meant not only that it is in some sense conscious, but that it has what we recognise in ourselves as the higher forms of consciousness. And secondly when he declares that they are spiritual, he means to include in that term quite a large number of different properties. The idealist means to assert that they are in some sense neither lifeless nor unconscious, as they certainly seem to be and I do not think his language is so grossly deceptive, but that we may assume him to believe that they really are very different indeed from what they seem. Chairs and tables and mountains seem to be very different from us but, when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more like us than we think. These points are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have. There are two points about this assertion to which I wish to call attention. Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts that it is spiritual. ![]()
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